Competition and transactions in the Danish food industry:a survey of firms' views by Baker, Derek & Graber-Lützhøft, Kimmie
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
Competition and transactions in the Danish food industry
Baker, Derek; Graber-Lützhøft, Kimmie
Publication date:
2007
Document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (APA):
Baker, D., & Graber-Lützhøft, K. (2007). Competition and transactions in the Danish food industry: a survey of
firms' views. Copenhagen: Fødevareøkonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet. IFRO Working Paper, No. 16,
Vol.. 2007
Download date: 02. Feb. 2020
  
 
Competition and transactions in the  
Danish food industry 
A survey of firms’ views 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institute of Food and Resource Economics (FOI) 
Working Paper 2007/16 
Competition and transactions in the Danish food industry 
A survey of firms’ views 
Derek Baker and Kimmie Graber-Lützhøft 
E-mail: db@foi.dk 
Abstract 
A survey of Danish food industry firms is used to examine firms’ views on develop-
ments in conduct throughout the Danish food marketing chain. Against expectations, 
there is weak evidence of narrowing food channels, particularly on the buying side. 
There is evidence of concentration amongst sellers, and to a lesser extent amongst 
buyers. Against expectations, concentration amongst buyers and sellers is easing. 
Most firms identify retailers as the holders of market power, and claim that the mar-
ket power is exercised as within-chain actions such as slotting fees and the shifting of 
risks. This differs markedly from the actions claimed by the firms identifying proces-
sors as the holders of market power. Few firms identified market power as a con-
straint on new products’ development and introduction. Although many firms claimed 
that retailers’ own-label brands are used as instruments of market power, a qualified 
majority of firms also expressed enthusiasm for such brands in their marketing plans. 
However, most firms claimed that retailers’ own-label brands are less profitable than 
private brands. The paper presents tables of results that extend to consideration of 
firms attributes in their responses to survey questions. It is concluded by a discussion 
section and identified future research topics.  
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Preface 
This Working Paper presents firms’ views on competition and transactions within the 
Danish food and agricultural marketing chain, as expressed in survey responses. This 
research is conducted under the auspices of the project “Perspektiver for og Udvikling 
af den danske fødevarekæde (phase 2)”, commonly known as “the food chain pro-
ject”. This project is funded under the Inovationsloven and administered by the Direc-
torate of Food, Fisheries and Agribusiness (DFFE) of the Danish Ministry of Agricul-
ture. 
 
Thanks are due to Mogens Lund for a review of drafts of the paper.  
 
 
 
 
Division Director, Production and Technology, Mogens Lund 
Institute of Food and Resource Economics 
Copenhagen, December 2007 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
Competition in agriculture and the food industry is a subject attracting considerable 
attention from researchers and industry commentators, as well as policy makers and 
food industry firms. In the past, food industry competition has been interpreted 
mainly in the context of farm incomes and consumer expenditures on food. More re-
cently, conduct within the food marketing chain and the resultant allocation of added 
value have gained prominence. However, few studies have addressed the actions and 
experiences of firms, nor their expressed views on such developments. The Danish 
food industry is characterised by extreme concentration at all stages of the food mar-
keting chain across most commodity sectors, which offers potential for the exercise of 
market power in a range of settings. To the author’s knowledge, this study is the first 
attempt to quantify such behaviour and its impacts by using firms’ recent experience.  
1.2. Purpose of study 
The intended audience for this Report includes firms and industry organisations, as 
well as policy makers. It has the following objectives: 
1. To present firms’ views on competitive structures and practices in the Danish 
food industry; 
2. To discuss those views in the light of past research; 
3. To draw conclusions of interest to firms and policy makers; and 
4. To identify topics requiring further research.  
1.3. The “Food Chain Project” 
This research is conducted under the auspices of the project1 “Perspektiver for og Ud-
vikling af den danske fødevarekæde (phase 2)”, commonly known as “the food chain 
project”. This project is funded under the Inovationsloven and administered by the 
Directorate of Food, Fisheries and Agribusiness (DFFE) of the Danish Ministry of 
Agriculture. The objectives of the project are to: 
• measure changes in function, structure and commercial practice in the Danish food 
industry and compare and contrast these with developments in other countries;  
                                                 
1 Further information about the project is available from the author at db@foi.dk. 
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• characterise vertical and horizontal relationships in the Danish food chain and 
their role in delivering optimal levels of food quality, variety and safety; 
• evaluate the efficiency and competitiveness of the Danish food system at each sta-
ge of the marketing chain; 
• review and evaluate instruments of Danish, EU and foreign public policy  in the 
development of the food marketing chain; and  
• communicate research results in a number of media. 
1.4. Outline of Report 
The following section identifies some current issues in economic analysis of within-
chain competition in the food industry. Section 3 provides detail of the survey data-
base and the nature of responding firms. These are applied in the discussion of the re-
sults presented in sections 4-7. Section 4 presents firms’ reported numbers of trading 
partners and their dynamics and concentration. Section 5 summarises firms ‘ views on 
the location of market power within the food marketing chain and the means used to 
exercise it. Section 6 reports the use and nature of contracts within the food marketing 
chain and section 7 presents firms’ use of, experience, and views on retailers’ own-
label brands. Section 8 is a discussion of results and their implications for firms and 
policy makers, as well as the research agenda for food industry competition. Section 8 
contains a summary table for hypotheses tested. 
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2. Competition and transactions 
2.1. Market power 
Theoretical and practical views of competition centre on its capacity for, and role in, 
maximising social welfare as a consequence of production and consumption levels 
guided by markets and competitive pressures on prices. In essence, larger numbers of 
trading partners indicate “more competitive” industrial structures and the absence of 
barriers to firms’ entry to and exit from industries. Conversely, few firms in an indus-
try or serving a particular market provides potential for exercise of market power.  
 
Conventionally, policy concern has centred on monopoly actions: restriction of mar-
ket volumes in order to drive up prices; accompanied by barriers to entry by other 
firms that would expand market volumes. Analysis of market and industrial competi-
tiveness has centred on numbers of firms, patterns of entry and exit, and the extent to 
which observed market prices exceed those that might be achieved in a more competi-
tive market. Market power in input markets due to monopsony is in evidence where 
prices paid to suppliers are below those believed to be competitive.2  However, be-
cause the firms in question are large and growing over the periods of analytical inter-
est, profits are also affected by economies of scale and cost-related efficiencies. Iden-
tifying the separate effects of market power and scale economies has proven diffi-
cult.3     
 
Studies of the entire food marketing chain are less common than analyses of firms at a 
single stage of the chain. They have used a range of formal and less formal method-
ologies, including algebraic models (e.g. Holloway, 1991), price transmission mecha-
nisms (Suzuki et al., 1993), co-integration (Reed and Clark, 2000; and notably Jensen 
and Møller, 20074 for the Danish food industry), game theoretic bargaining models 
(Giulietti, 1996) and ad hoc comparisons of retail margins with processors-retailer 
relationships (Collins, 2002). This body of work delivers a range of results on market 
power qualified by economies of scale.  
 
                                                 
2 Reviews of such studies in the food industry include Sheldon and Sperling (2003), Sexton and 
Lavoie (2001), Griffith (2000) and Digal and Ahmadi-Esfahani (2002). 
3 See Morrison Paul (2001). 
4 A study conducted under the auspices of the current project. 
 
8    FOI    Competition and transactions in the Danish food industry 
2.2. Change in the food sector 
The food industry has experienced substantial consolidation5 in recent decades. Re-
ductions in numbers of firms at retail, wholesale and processing level are well docu-
mented for Denmark (Baker et al., 2007) where such trends between 1995 and 2000 
were more extreme than in any other European country (Baker, 2003).6  Similar 
trends have occurred in the United States (Rogers, 2001; USDA, 2002). Numbers of 
farm businesses are also in decline in most countries (Brouwer and Bijmann, 2001), 
as are numbers of input suppliers, banks and other service providers, and firms in al-
lied industries such as food ingredients production. Proposed causes of consolidation 
are many, including the availability of economies of scale, scope, and the sporadic 
enthusiasm for merger and acquisition (OECD, 2003; Wrigley, 2001), including in 
Denmark (see Hanson, 2005) and in the context of cross-border mergers (Dobson, 
1999; Marsden et al., 1997 and UK Competition Commission, 2000). This consolida-
tion has been accompanied by concentration in the food industry (Viaenne and 
Gellynk, 1995; Baker, 2003) which is today at high levels throughout Europe and par-
ticularly in Denmark. 
 
The consolidation and concentration of food retailing in Europe has been rapid and 
extreme (OECD, 2003), and has occurred in association with widespread acceptance 
that real consumer food prices are in decline rather than rising according to monop-
oly-type models. At the same time, supply chain developments have occurred that 
make some distribution and wholesale functions redundant or able to be adopted by 
retailers (Fearne and Hughes, 2002). This is just one element of vertically co-
ordinated actions amongst food marketing chain participants, generally known as  
channel development. Occurring as it does amongst fewer and fewer firms, this proc-
ess has been dubbed “food convergence” (Cotterill, 1997), which might follow sev-
eral models associated either with dominant retailers or processors.  
2.3. Vertical organisation in the food marketing chain 
Relations within the food marketing chain, or “vertical organisation”, has been exam-
ined in some depth by recent theoretical and applied research. This essentially de-
scribes a shift away from market transactions within channels, and toward a range of 
                                                 
5 “Consolidation” is the phenomenon of declining numbers of firms in an industry. A related, but 
not equivalent, concept is “concentration”, whereby market share is not evenly divided amongst re-
maining firms during consolidation. Rather, a few very large firms accumulate the majority of mar-
ket share and the industry is said to have become “concentrated”.  
6 Traill and Gilpin (1994) present similar results from an earlier period. 
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co-ordination activities whereby contracts, and other agreements linked to perform-
ance, guide relationships and exchange. Hanf and Dautzenburg (2006) describe a 
generalised model of vertically-oriented “network” that is led and/or dominated by a 
“focal firm”. 
 
A recent focus has been within-chain actions by retailers (as focal firms) that may in-
volve monopsony action toward processors, as well as an array of actions purported to 
extract value added from suppliers for the benefit of retailers. These have aroused 
considerable concerns in policy circles (e.g. Office of Fair Trading, 2001; UK Com-
petition Commission, 2000; OECD, 1999, 2003) and include, but are not restricted to: 
exclusive buying or selling practices; payments to ensure access to shelf space (so-
called “slotting fees”7); requirements to pay promotion and advertising costs; physical 
delivery and stocking of shelves; and refunding of payment for unsold stocks or prod-
uct failures. Such behaviour receives some limited support from some economists on 
efficiency grounds, particularly on the basis of efficient allocation of both effort and 
risk within the supply chain. On the other hand such behaviour has also been inter-
preted as a threat to new product introductions or innovation more generally in the 
supply chain (Harris, 2002). McLaughlin and Rao (1990) propose that new product 
introductions are the outcome of various shared, coordinated and co-requisite activi-
ties by firms at various points in the food marketing chain, an idea examined in case 
studies in Denmark by Boon (2001).  
 
Hughes (2002) lists new product introduction (by a variety of methods and branding 
profiles) as just one element of implementation of strategies that increasingly charac-
terise channels in the European food industry. Based on US experience, Sparks (1997) 
describes the ways in which a single retailer can use a range of qualities of retailers’ 
own-label brands to implement a complex strategy. While brands are also thought to 
have been used as instruments of vertically-oriented market power (Baker et al., 2006; 
Connor, 1999), of particular interest to researchers have been retailers’ own-label 
brands, which have accrued substantial market share in several European countries, 
including Denmark (UK Competition Commission, 2000). Retailers’ own-label 
brands have been applauded and/or criticised by a variety of authors for their store-
level (Collins, 2002), firm-level (Ward et al., 2002; Sparks, 1997) and industry level 
(Borghesani et al., 1997) impacts. In general, the firm-level effects on processors are 
thought to be positive in the sense of capacity utilisation, negative in the sense of pro-
                                                 
7 See McCorriston and Sheldon (1997) for an estimate of such transfers in the US food system. 
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ducing competing products, and ambiguous as regards the necessary exchange of in-
formation between retailers and processors. 
 
In association with channel development has been the shift in policy emphasis toward 
systemic approaches to issues such as environment, food safety, traceability8 and 
animal welfare. This chain-relevant approach is one element of what and Maxwell 
and Slater (2003) call “New Food Policy”. With regard to food industry competition, 
“horizontal” antimonopoly and antitrust policies have, as a first line of defence, scru-
tiny of mergers and acquisitions. Two high profile mergers of food processors in 
Denmark received considerable attention across Europe in this regard.9,10   
 
 
                                                 
8 More correctly known as “identity preservation” or “IP”. 
9 Two pork processing firms (EU Case No COMP/M.2662 - DANISH CROWN/STEFF-
HOULBERG), two Scandinavian dairy processing firms (Danish Competition Authority 1999, 
2000, 2004a, b), and a British and Scandinavian dairy processor (UK Competition Commission 
2003). 
10 Abuse of market power in the food chain in a vertical sense has prompted a number of actions by 
authorities in recent years, such as intervention in a dispute over one dairy processor’s illegally en-
forcing exclusivity with a retailer, at the expense of a rival dairy processor (Danish Competition Au-
thority, 2006). 
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3. Hypotheses, data and method 
3.1. Hypotheses addressed in the study 
Based on the foregoing, this study examines the hypotheses listed in table 1.  
 
Table 1. Hypotheses to be tested 
   
 T
 
opic H
 
ypotheses 
 
1 Numbers of sellers • Decline 2000-2005 
   
2 Numbers of buyers • Decline 2000-2005 
   
3 Concentration in trading partners • Currently high 
• More intense 2000-2005 
   
4 Firms’ views on location of market 
power 
• Most firms identify retailers 
   
 
 
5 
 
 
Form of market power exercised 
• Differ depending on location of the  market power 
• Differ depending on the type of firm making the claim 
• Changes in form 2000-2005 
• Many firms will claim to experience within-chain in-
struments (e.g. slotting fees, shifts of risk), rather 
than conventional monopoly-monopsony action  
   
 
 
6 
 
 
Contracts 
• More widely used 2000-2005 
• Longer 2000-2005 
• Changed in content 2000-2005 
• Usage differs amongst types of firm 
• Content differs amongst types of firm 
   
7 New product development • Firms will claim that market power is a significant 
constraint 
   
8 “Stricter anti-monopoly policy” • Large firms view this as a threat, smaller firms as an 
opportunity 
   
9 Retailers’ own-label brands • Not favoured by firms 
• Seen as less profitable than manufacturers’ brands 
• Overall, seen as a negative thing   
3.2. Method 
Survey data are employed. Inference will be drawn based on comparisons of average 
results for years 2000 and 2005, and amongst dis-aggregations of data according to 
firm size, stage of marketing chain and other features.  
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3.3. Survey procedure 
An interview-based survey of Danish food industry firms11 was conducted November 
- December 2005 and March - June 2006. Draft questionnaires were prepared, and re-
peatedly circulated to 15 different organisations with an interest in food industry re-
search, during the period May-October 2005. Six food industry firms made them-
selves available for testing of the later drafts of the questionnaire, in many cases being 
the subjects of numerous mock interviews. The comments, criticisms and proposals of 
both stakeholders and firms were, as far as possible, incorporated into questionnaire 
and research design. 
 
The questionnaire comprised 5 sections. In the first, basic descriptive numeric infor-
mation about firms was requested. The second section requested information about 
firms’ strategic emphases and actions, the third addressed new product introduction 
and branding, the fourth firms’ views on their competitive environment and the final 
section firms’ views on actual events and possible future ones. Each interview took 
around 50 minutes and targeted the firms’ marketing manager or person responsible 
for marketing and purchasing. 
 
A commercial database of firms’ contact details was purchased, with stratified sam-
pling based on size (across size groups but excluding firms with less than 5 employ-
ees) and sector (just 8 sectors included), and across three stages of the marketing 
chain (retail, wholesale and processing). This sampling procedure yielded 986 firms, 
in many cases being the total number of eligible firms, given the stratified sample. Af-
ter eliminating defunct firms, incorrect contact details, subsidiaries of other firms in 
the sample, telephone contacts were made with 444 firms. A telephone protocol was 
followed, and some 200 interviews were arranged. A team of 6 students were trained 
in all aspects of the survey from initial telephone contacts to detail of interview tech-
nique and data processing. 
3.4. Data 
The survey procedure12 yielded 131 valid responses (a 30% response rate on 444 
firms). The degree to which the survey is representative of the population of Danish 
food industry firms cannot be directly estimated, although table 2 below provides an 
                                                 
11 The targeted firms were, by design, from non-farm stages of the marketing chain. 
12 Communications, logistics, training, data management and survey financing were all managed by 
student worker Anja Skadkær Møller. 
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overview. Eleven firms from the sectors “ingredients”, “primary agriculture” and 
various “services” also appear in the survey dataset. These firms are classified by Sta-
tistics Danmark as being one of retailers, processors or wholesalers, but claim to op-
erate at another stage of the chain. 
 
The numbers of firms in the population (Statistics Denmark, 2006) includes firms 
with less than 5 employees, defunct firms, subsidiary firms and/or firms otherwise in-
eligible for the survey. Coverage rates range from the very low (8 unspecialised retail 
firms out of 3129 in the country) to quite large (9 of 39 fruit and vegetable processors, 
and 17 of 61 dairy processing plants (including ice cream manufacturers)). Many of 
the largest and best-known of Denmark’s food industry firms participated in the sur-
vey.13  Clearly, coverage and representativeness is greatest amongst processing firms, 
although sufficient wholesale and retail firms are included to allow some inference to 
be drawn. 
 
Table 2. Numbers of firms: sample and population characteristics 
         
 Numbers of firms 
 Processing Retail Wholesale Other 
         
Commodity sector Popn. Survey Popn. Survey Popn. Survey Popn. Survey 
         
Feed 43  na  na   1 
Fruit and vegetables 39 9 556  219 2  1 
Dairy 61 17 119  130 4  2 
Beef 24 5 na  na    
Pork 26 3 na  na    
Poultry 8 3 na  na 1  2 
Unspecialised meat na 10 724 8 235 6  1 
Unspecialised na 7 3129 17 241 28  4   
n
 
a not available. 
3.5. Characteristics of responding firms 
By design, firms in just 8 commodity sectors were surveyed, including “unspecial-
ised” and “unspecialised meat”, which together make up 81 firms of 131 (see figure 
1). 
                                                 
13 Confidentiality precludes disclosure of firms’ names, and detailed discussion of their sector and 
location. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of firms surveyed, by commodity sector 
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Beef; 5
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Poultry; 6
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Feeds; 1
Fruits and 
vegetables; 12
  
 
 
The survey addressed principally the non-farm stages of the food marketing chain, 
including services and ingredients. As seen in figure 2, processing, wholesale and dis-
tribution and retailing dominate the dataset.14
 
Figure 2. Distribution of firms surveyed, by stage of chain 
 
 
Wholesale 
and 
distribution; 39
Retail; 27
Processing; 
54
Ingredients; 5
Primary 
agriculture; 4
Services; 2
  
                                                 
14 The four firms classified as primary agriculture are firms that describe themselves in that way de-
spite having functions at other stages of the chain and being registered with commercial authorities 
in other stages of the chain. 
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Firms in the survey averaged annual sales of 812.5 million DKK and employed an 
average of 333.4 employees. Figures 3 and 4 display the firms’ distributions accord-
ing to revenue and labour force size classes. In both cases a reasonable cross-section 
of size classes was achieved. 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of firms surveyed, by revenue size class 
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Figure 4. Distribution of firms surveyed, by employment size class 
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All regions of Denmark yielded at least 3 firms in the survey, with the exception of 
Bornholm, which yielded none (see figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Distribution of firms surveyed, by location 
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4. Numbers of trading partners 
4.1. Numbers of suppliers 
Surveyed firms reported the average number of suppliers of farm-based raw materials 
as just over 180 in 2000 (table 3). By 2005 this had declined 23% to about 139. It is 
notable that the maximum number of suppliers amongst survey firms declined by 
24%, an even greater decline than the average. This decline is not statistically signifi-
cant, probably due to the very large standard deviation15 (which narrows between 
2000 and 2005). 
 
Table 3. Number of suppliers of farm-based raw materials 
    
All firms 2000 2005 t-test 
    
Average 180,1 138,9 ns 
Minimum 0 0  
Maximum 14.500 11.000  
Std deviation 1357,8 992,8    
K
 
ey: ns not significant; * 10% level of test; ** 5% level of test; *** 1% level of test. 
 
 
Table 4 reports the average number of suppliers for firms, divided according to size 
group. The decline in number of suppliers appears largest for the smallest and largest 
firms, with the 250-500 million DKK sales groups reporting zero change. It is notable 
that the only size group reporting statistically-significant change in suppliers was the 
500-1000 million DKK group, and this group featured an average 22% increase in 
number of suppliers. 
 
Table 4. Average number of suppliers of farm-based raw materials, by sales 
     
Size group (million DKK sales) 2000 2005 % change t-test 
     
 <10 5.7 4.6 -19% ns 
10-50 62.0 58.7 -5% ns 
50-250 36.7 35.2 -4% ns 
250-500 45.4 45.2 0% ns 
500-1000 65.5 80.2 22% * 
>1000 1770.2 1358.3 -23% ns   
K
 
ey: ns not significant; * 10% level of test; ** 5% level of test; *** 1% level of test. 
 
 
                                                 
15 Due to the inclusion of some primary producers (claiming no suppliers at all) along with some 
very large firms (claiming a full supplier base). 
 
18    FOI    Competition and transactions in the Danish food industry 
Across stages of the marketing chain (table 5), food processors reported the largest 
decline in numbers of suppliers (32%) while ingredients producers reported a 24% 
increase. Too few ingredients’ firms were included in the survey to justify a statistical 
test of this change. At other stages the average numbers of suppliers were little 
changed, although only wholesalers showed an increase (of 8%) in numbers of sup-
pliers between 2000 and 2005. 
 
Table 5. Average number of suppliers of farm-based raw materials, by stage 
     
Stage of chain  2000 2005 % change t-test 
     
Primary 25.8 25.5 -1% ns 
Processing 369.2 252.3 -32% *** 
Wholesale 86.2 93.3 8% *** 
Retail 12.7 12.3 -3% ns 
Ingredients 37.0 46.0 24%    
K
 
ey: ns not significant; * 10% level of test; ** 5% level of test; *** 1% level of test. 
 
 
When the data are subdivided by commodity sector, poultry processors are the only 
commodity-specialised firms that do not report a substantial decline in numbers of 
suppliers (table 6). The reported decline in suppliers to pork industry firms is very 
large, but involves too few firms for a statistical test. 
 
Table 6. Average number of suppliers of farm-based raw materials, by sector 
     
S
 
ector  2000 
 
2005 
 
% change 
 
t-test 
 
Fruit and vegetables 54.6 43.1 -21% ** 
Dairy 757.8 503.0 -34% ** 
Beef 42.6 35.8 -16% ns 
Pork 428.5 239.7 -44%  
Poultry 50.0 51.2 2% ns 
Unspecialised meat 47.4 48.5 2% ** 
Unspecialised  49.9 52.5 5% ns   
K
 
ey: ns not significant; * 10% level of test; ** 5% level of test; *** 1% level of test. 
 
 
Finally, the survey responses on numbers of suppliers are subdivided by vertical inte-
gration status: inwards (where firms are partly- or wholly-owned by firms from other 
stages of the supply chain); outwards (where firms partly- or wholly-own firms at 
other stages of the chain); inwards and outwards (both); and no vertical integration 
(neither). Table 7 indicates that firms with “inward” vertical integration and “no ver-
tical integration” have experienced a smaller decline in the number of suppliers than 
have firms with other vertical integration status.  
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Table 7. Average number of suppliers of farm-based raw materials, by vertical 
intrgration 
      
Vertical integration status 
Number of 
firms 2000 2005 
% chan-
ge t-test 
      
Vertical integration inwards  28 89.7 81.6 -9% ns  
Vertical integration outwards 25 760.6 563.0 -26% ** 
Vertical integration inwards and outwards 5 3842.3 2924.5 -24%  
No vertical integration 83 42.4 40.5 -5% ns   
K
 
ey: ns not significant; * 10% level of test; ** 5% level of test; *** 1% level of test. 
4.2. Numbers of buyers 
Turning to the numbers of buyers reported by the surveyed firms, table 8 provides av-
erages and other sample characteristics. In the remainder of this section, firms from 
the retail stage have been excluded, as consideration of the number of buyers refers to 
retail customers. After excluding retail firms, table 8’s lower rows indicate a 10% de-
cline from an average of 493 buyers to 441, although this is not statistically signifi-
cant at levels of test below 10%. The maximum number of buyers reported has de-
clined 30% and, as for firms’ responses regarding sellers (table 8), there has been a 
significant narrowing in the standard deviation.  
 
Table 8. Number of buyers 
    
A
 
ll firms1     
   
 2000 2005 t-test 
    
Average 493.5 441.4 ns 
Minimum 1 1  
maximum 10000 7000  
std deviation 1529.2 1144.7    
1. Excludes retailers. 
K
 
ey: ns not significant; * 10% level of test; ** 5% level of test; *** 1% level of test. 
 
 
The smallest firms (retailers excluded) (see table 9) report a large decline in the num-
ber of buyers between 2000 and 2005, but firms with sales of 250 million DKK or 
more (again excluding retailers) report large increases. 
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Table 9. Average number of buyers, by sales 
     
Size group (by million DKK sales)1 2000 2005 % change t-test 
     
 <10  11.6 9.0 -22% ns 
10-50  99.1 131.9 33% ns 
50-250  424.4 336.4 -21% ns 
250-500  156.0 194.7 25% ns 
500-1000  1101.0 1702.0 55% ns 
>1000  1352.2 1518.8 12% ns   
1. Retail firms excluded. 
K
 
ey: ns not significant; * 10% level of test; ** 5% level of test; *** 1% level of test. 
 
 
Table 10 presents survey results on numbers of buyers, subdivided by stage of chain. 
Wholesale firms, on average, report an 11% decline in numbers of  buyers, while in-
gredients suppliers report a statistically-significant 26% growth in numbers of buyers. 
 
Table 10. Average number of buyers, by stage 
     
S
 
tage of chain1 2000 
 
2005 
 
% change 
 
 
 
Primary 50.3 47.3 -6% ns 
Processing 157.3 149.0 -5% ns 
Wholesale 908.5 807.2 -11% ns 
Ingredients 97.5 122.5 26% **   
1. Retail firms excluded. 
K
 
ey: ns not significant; * 10% level of test; ** 5% level of test; *** 1% level of test. 
 
 
Across sectors (see table 11), unspecialised firms (retailers excluded) report the great-
est declines in numbers of buyers, while firms in the dairy and pork,16 and unspecial-
ised meat, sectors report large increases in the number of buyers. 
 
                                                 
16 Results for the pork sector firms contain too few observations for a statistical test. 
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Table 11. Number of buyers, by sector 
     
Sector1 2000 2005 % change  
     
Fruit and vegetables 113.4 115.2 2% ns 
Dairy 55.1 96.0 74% ** 
Beef 124.6 121.8 -2% ns 
Pork 237.5 290.0 22%  
Poultry 105.3 100.2 -5% ns 
Unspecialised meat 84.2 115.3 37% ** 
Unspecialised  1112.0 974.2 -12% ns   
1. Retail firms excluded. 
K
 
ey: ns not significant; * 10% level of test; ** 5% level of test; *** 1% level of test. 
 
 
Firms vertically-integrated “outwards” (i.e. those partly- or wholly-owning firms at 
different stages of the marketing chain) report a 25% decline in numbers of buyers, 
but other vertically-integrated firms report large increases. Firms with no vertical in-
tegration report a very slight decline in number of buyers (table 12). 
 
Table 12. Number of buyers, by vertical integration 
     
Vertical integration status1 2000 2005 % change  
     
Vertical integration inwards 79.5 120.9 52% ns 
Vertical integration outwards 1076.8 804.2 -25% ns 
Vertical integration inwards and outwards 162.3 270.0 66%  
No vertical integration 454.2 443.7 -2% ns   
1. Retail firms excluded. 
K
 
ey: ns not significant; * 10% level of test; ** 5% level of test; *** 1% level of test. 
4.3. Concentration amongst suppliers and buyers 
Table 13 and 14 provide insight into the concentration amongst surveyed firms’ sup-
pliers and buyers. For 2000, surveyed firms reported an average of 180.1 suppliers 
(table 4.11). Of those 180.1 suppliers, just 14.8 suppliers on average sold 75% (by 
value) of the inputs purchased by firms. This means that just 8% of the suppliers sup-
plied 75% of the firms’ inputs. Between 2000 and 2005, the average total number of 
suppliers fell 23% to 138.9, as described above. The number of suppliers of 75% of 
inputs by value declined 12% in the same period. This means that between 2000 and 
2005, concentration amongst suppliers eased slightly. 
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Table 13. Concentration in suppliers 
     
All firms 2000 2005 % change  
     
Number of suppliers 180.1 138.9 -23%  
Number of suppliers supplying 75% of farm-based input, 
by value 14.8 13.0 -12% ns 
Proportion of sellers that are included in those selling 75% 
by value 8% 9%     
K
 
ey: ns not significant; * 10% level of test; ** 5% level of test; *** 1% level of test. 
 
 
Table 14 examines the concentration amongst buyers (retail firms are excluded). Al-
though the total number of buyers declined 11%, the number buying 75% (by value) 
of firms’ output averaged an increase of 6%. In 2000, 32% of buyers purchased 75% 
of sales from these firms, and by 2005 this share had risen to 39% of buying firms. 
Table 14 indicates that, on the buying side, concentration has eased substantially. 
 
Table 14. Concentration in buyers 
     
A
 
ll firms1 2000 
 
2005 
 
% change 
 
 
 
Number of buyers 493.5 441.4 -11%  
Number of buyers buying 75% of sales by value 160.3 170.7 6% ns 
Proportion of buyers that are included in those buying 75% 
by value 32% 39%     
1. Firms from retail stage excluded. 
K
 
ey: ns not significant; * 10% level of test; ** 5% level of test; *** 1% level of test. 
 
 
Examination of the co-occurrence between concentration in firms’ buying and selling 
sides yielded a statistically-insignificant correlation co-efficient of around 7%. This 
indicates few firm-specific determinants of concentration amongst trading partners. 
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Figures 6-8 present the surveyed firms’ reported changes in concentration in numbers 
of buyers and sellers, disaggregated by firm size, stage of chain and commodity sec-
tor, respectively (it should be noted that retailers are excluded from the analysis of 
numbers of buyers).  
 
Across most size groups, the number of suppliers selling 75% of inputs by value has 
declined, by 10-25%. The size interval 500-1000 million DKK is an exception, with 
an ensing of concentration in suppliers between 2000 and 2005. Aside from the small-
est firms, buyer concentration has changed less between 2000 and 2005 than has 
seller concentration. Notably, two size groups report an average increase in the num-
ber of buyers buying 75% of sales, with firms in the 500-1000 million DKK group 
reporting an average increase of around 70% in the number of buyers buying 75% of 
sales.  
 
Figure 6. Change in concentration amongst buyers and sellers, by sales 
 
-60% -40% -20% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
 <10 million
10-50 million
50-250 million
250-500 million
500-1000 million
>1000 million
All firms
% change in numbers of buyers and suppliers: 2005 cf. 2000
suppliers selling 75% by value
buyers buying 75% by value
 
 
N
 
ote: Firms from retail stage excluded from analysis of buyers. 
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Figure 7 presents the same data, disaggregated by stage of the food marketing chain. 
Processing firms and ingredients suppliers report large average declines in the number 
of buyers buying 75% of sales, while processors and retailers report large declines in 
numbers of suppliers selling 75% of inputs.  
 
Figure 7. Change in concentration amongst buyers and sellers, by stage 
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ote: Firms from retail stage excluded from analysis of buyers. 
 
 
By sector (figure 8), the results are dominated by a very large (140%) increase in 
numbers of buyers of 75% of sales by dairy-sector firms. Pork and unspecialised meat 
sector firms also report this easing of average concentration amongst buyers, albeit at 
less extreme levels. Across almost all sectors, concentration amongst suppliers be-
came more pronounced while concentration amongst buyers has eased.  
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Figure 8. Change in concentration amongst buyers and sellers, by sector 
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5. Firms’ views on market power 
5.1. Possession of market power 
In response to a question about the location of market power within the food market-
ing chain in both 2000 and 2005, around 70% of surveyed firms claimed that retail 
firms “hold the most market power” (table 15). The next most popular response was 
processors (about 15% of surveyed firms), while about 10% did not know. These pro-
portions were unchanged between 2000 and 2005.  
 
Table 15. % of all firms stating that each stage of the food chain holds the most 
market power 
    
Stage of the food chain holding the most market power 2000 2005  
    
Retailers 70% 73% ns 
Distributors and/or wholesalers 5% 4% ns 
Processors 14% 16% ns 
Farmers 2% 2% ns 
Don't know/other 10% 8% ns   
Note: % do not add to 100% as several firms nominated more than stage 
Key: ns not significant; * 10% level of test; ** 5% level of test; *** 1% level of test. 
 
5.2. Exercise of market power 
Firms’ views on the instruments used to exercise market power are summarised in 
figure 9. Few surveyed firms reported traditional monopoly-type instruments (restric-
tions on sales volumes, exclusivity agreements for sales), but in sharp contrast about 
60% reported monopsony-type actions by buyers (restricting purchases to drive down 
prices) and about 40% reported exclusivity agreements by purchasers. Other actions 
by buyers (demanding payment for access to shelf space, threat of non-purchase 
across a range of products) were also reported by 30-50% of surveyed firms. About 
half the surveyed firms reported “use of retailers’ own-label brands” as an instrument 
in the exercise of market power. 
 
Institutional arrangements were also identified by surveyed firms as means of exercis-
ing market power: group action (including co-operative action) was reported in this 
way by about 40% of firms, and 12% reported “networking arrangements by firms, 
organisations and politicians”. On the same theme, about 40% of firms reported the 
“ability to manipulate the policy process” as an instrument of market power. 
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Some 40% of firms reported the “shifting of risk” within the food marketing chain as 
an instrument of market power, indicating the importance of actions beyond conven-
tional monopoly and monopsony action. It is notable that most of the cited actions 
were claimed by similar numbers of surveyed firms for both 2000 and 2005, with the 
exception of retailers own-label brands, payments for access to shelf space (“slotting 
fees”) and monopsony action to drive down prices. 
 
Figure 9. Firms' views on the instruments used to exercise market power in the 
food chain 
 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Restrictions on sales volumes to drive up prices
Restrictions on purchases to drive down prices
Group action, co-operatives, and associations
Networking arrangements by firms, organisations,
and politicians
Anti-competitive exclusivity agreements for
purchasing 
Anti-competitive exclusivity agreements for sales
The use of retailers' own-label brands
Retailers' demanding payment from suppliers for
shelf space
Buyers' threats of non-purchase across a range of
products
Shifting of risks to other market chain participants
Ability to manipulate the policy process and
regulation
Don't know
2005
2000
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Surveyed firms’ views on the instruments used to exercise market power in 2005 
were very different, depending on the perceived location of the market power (see 
figure 10). Firms claiming that retailers possessed the most market power also 
claimed that retailers used such instruments as monopsony actions, retailers’ own-
label and within-chain pressures on suppliers. Firms that reported processors as the 
holders of the most market power identified monopoly actions, exclusivity agree-
ments (for buying and selling), and the ability to manipulate the policy process. Nota-
bly, 20% of firms that nominated processors as the holders of market power did not 
know which instruments of market power processors were exercising. 
 
Figure 10. Firms' impressions of the way in which market power is exercised, sub-
divided by the stage at which they believe market power to be held 
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Tables 16-19 disaggregate surveyed firms’ statements about the exercise of market 
power by size (selected size classes only, table 16), stage of chain, sector, and vertical 
integration status. Small firms’ responses (table 16) feature support for the view that 
market power is exercised in exclusivity agreements for purchasing (but not sales), 
buyers’ threat of non-purchase and by powerful firms’ ability to manipulate the policy 
process (53% of small firms). Large firms, in contrast, identified monopoly action, 
various actions by retailers (75% of large firms identified use of retailers’ own-label), 
transfer of risks, and group action. Intermediate size categories (just two are shown 
here) tended to agree with larger firms about how market power was exercised, with 
perhaps more emphasis on monopsony action. In the 50-250 million DKK size class, 
fully 70% of firms identified the transfer of risk as an instrument of market power.  
 
Table 16. Specific instrument of market power by sales 
     
 Selected size group (million DKK sales) 
     
 
 
<10 50-250 500
 
-1000 >1000 
   
Instrument of market power 
% of firms stating that a specific instrument of 
market power is being used 
     
Restrictions on sales volumes to drive up prices 0% 8% 0% 17% 
Restrictions on purchases to drive down prices 33% 68% 71% 50% 
Group action, co-operatives, and associations 27% 45% 14% 50% 
Networking arrangements by firms, organisations, and 
politicians 13% 20% 0% 25% 
Anti-competitive exclusivity agreements for purchasing  40% 48% 14% 17% 
Anti-competitive exclusivity agreements for sales 27% 18% 14% 0% 
The use of retailers' own-label brands 33% 68% 71% 75% 
Retailers' demanding payment from suppliers for shelf 
space 27% 50% 57% 50% 
Buyers' threats of non-purchase across a range of 
products 47% 65% 29% 58% 
Shifting of risks to other market chain participants 33% 70% 29% 50% 
Ability to manipulate the policy process and regulation 53% 35% 43% 42% 
Don't know 20% 5% 29% 8%   
N
 
ote. Columns do not sum to 100%. 
 
 
Across chain stages (table 17), there is reasonable agreement amongst firms about the 
use of instruments of market power. Just 48% of surveyed retail firms claimed that 
retailers’ own-label brands were being used as an instrument of market power, com-
pared to 61% of processors and 64% of wholesalers. Payments for access to shelf 
space (“slotting fees”) were identified by just 35% of the processors surveyed, but by 
over half of both retailers and wholesalers surveyed. The stages also differed in their 
views about exclusivity.  
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Table 17. Specific instrument of market power by stage 
    
 Stage of chain 
    
 
 
Processing Wholesale Retail 
   
Instrument of market power 
% of firms stating that a specific instrument 
of market power is being used 
    
Restrictions on sales volumes to drive up prices 9% 8% 15% 
Restrictions on purchases to drive down prices 61% 56% 59% 
Group action, co-operatives, and associations 33% 36% 44% 
Networking arrangements by firms, organisations, and poli-
ticians 17% 10% 15% 
Anti-competitive exclusivity agreements for purchasing  43% 33% 33% 
Anti-competitive exclusivity agreements for sales 13% 13% 33% 
The use of retailers' own-label brands 61% 64% 48% 
Retailers' demanding payment from suppliers for shelf 
space 35% 51% 52% 
Buyers' threats of non-purchase across a range of prod-
ucts 52% 44% 52% 
Shifting of risks to other market chain participants 50% 41% 44% 
Ability to manipulate the pollicy process and regulation 37% 36% 41% 
Don't know 9% 10% 11%   
N
 
ote. Columns do not sum to 100%. 
 
 
Table 18 presents the same data, disaggregated by sector. Surveyed firms from differ-
ent sectors generally agree on the use/non-use of monopoly and monopsony instru-
ments, threats of non-purchase across a range of items, use of retailers’ own-label, 
risk transfer and the ability to manipulate policy. Wide disparities are observed con-
cerning the use of group action, exclusivity agreements, collusion and networking 
agreements. It is notable that significant proportions of surveyed pork and dairy firms 
expressed the view that group action was being exercised as an instrument of market 
power, while no surveyed poultry sector firms expressed this view.  
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Table 18. Specific instrument of market power by sector 
        
 Sector 
        
 Fruit and ve-
getables 
D
airy  
Beef  
Pork  
Poultry  
U
nspecialised 
m
eat 
U
nspecialised   
        
Instrument of market power 
% of firms stating that a specific instrument of market 
power is being used 
        
Restrictions on sales volumes to drive up prices 8% 4% 20% 33% 17% 8% 11% 
Restrictions on purchases to drive down prices 58% 65% 60% 100% 67% 52% 59% 
Group action, co-operatives, and associations 17% 35% 40% 67% 0% 44% 39% 
Networking arrangements by firms, organisa-
tions, and politicians 25% 22% 0% 33% 17% 8% 13% 
Anti-competitive exclusivity agreements for pur-
chasing  17% 39% 60% 67% 33% 52% 32% 
Anti-competitive exclusivity agreements for sales 0% 17% 0% 67% 0% 24% 18% 
The use of retailers' own-label brands 58% 65% 40% 67% 33% 44% 66% 
Retailers' demanding payment from suppliers for 
shelf space 17% 43% 40% 33% 33% 20% 63% 
Buyers' threats of non-purchase across a range 
of products 50% 52% 60% 33% 50% 32% 55% 
Shifting of risks to other market chain partici-
pants 42% 35% 40% 67% 33% 48% 52% 
Ability to manipulate the pollicy process and 
regulation 42% 30% 40% 33% 17% 40% 41% 
Don't know 8% 4% 0% 0% 0% 16% 11%   
Note. Columns do not sum to 100%. 
 
 
 
Firms that reported vertical integration both inward and outward reported views on 
the exercise of market power that are somewhat different from those of firms report-
ing other vertical integration status (see table 19). Inward-and-outward integrated 
firms particularly identified use of retailers’ own-label brands, but not monopoly and 
monopsony actions, and not group action. They also showed less support for claims 
of retailers’ use of slotting fees than did the other firms. 
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Table 19. Specific instrument of market power by vertical integration 
     
 Vertical integration status 
     
 
Vertical 
integration 
 inwards 
Vertical inte-
gration 
outwards 
Vertical 
integration   
inwards and 
outwards 
No vertical 
integration 
     
Instrument of market power 
% of firms stating that a specific instrument of market power 
is being used 
     
Restrictions on sales volumes to drive up prices 4% 4% 0% 13% 
Restrictions on purchases to drive down prices 57% 56% 40% 61% 
Group action, co-operatives, and associations 43% 32% 20% 35% 
Networking arrangements by firms, organisa-
tions, and politicians 21% 28% 40% 10% 
Anti-competitive exclusivity agreements for pur-
chasing  36% 40% 40% 39% 
Anti-competitive exclusivity agreements for sales 7% 12% 0% 22% 
The use of retailers' own-label brands 64% 68% 80% 55% 
Retailers' demanding payment from suppliers for 
shelf space 36% 44% 20% 46% 
Buyers' threats of non-purchase across a range 
of products 46% 48% 40% 51% 
Shifting of risks to other market chain partici-
pants 46% 48% 40% 45% 
Ability to manipulate the pollicy process and 
regulation 43% 40% 40% 36% 
Don't know 4% 8% 0% 11%   
N
 
ote. Columns do not sum to 100%. 
5.3. New products and market power 
Firms were asked to identify barriers to new product introduction from a list of poten-
tial barriers drawn from the literature,17 presented as “statements”. Three such state-
ments of potential barriers concerned competitive conditions within the food market-
ing chain (see table 20). Comparatively few firms identified these potential barriers as 
“major barriers to new product development and introduction”, but in each case there 
were statistically significant increases in the numbers during so. 
 
Table 20. % of firms reporting major barrier to new product development and in-
troduction 
    
S
 
tatement 2000 2005  
   
 % of firms agreeing 
with statement 
 
χ2-test 
    
The small number of retail firms restricts the demand for new products 16% 19% ** 
Retailers' own-label brands restrict access by this firm's new products 13% 17% * 
Buyers pass many introduction costs to this firm 14% 18% **   
                                                 
17 See Baker (2007) for a detailed summary of survey results. 
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5.4. Views on antimonopoly legislation 
Surveyed firms interpret “stricter anti-monopoly regulation” as neither an opportunity 
nor a threat (see table 21). 9% of firms viewed such a development as a “great oppor-
tunity” and only 6% viewed it as a threat of any kind. On average, the score was 0.3, 
or just slightly towards the “opportunity” end of the spectrum. 
 
Table 21. Firms’ views on implications of stricter antimonopoly regulation 
       
Firms' views on the implications of stricter anti-monopoly regulation in the future 
       
Score: 
-2 -1 0 1 2 
mean 
score 
       
Interpretation (serious threat)  
(neither opportu-
nity nor threat)  
(great 
opportuni-
ty)  
       
% of firms 0% 6% 67% 17% 9% 0% 
       
Event interpreted as a threat and/or opportunity to the firm: mean score all firms 
       
Stricter anti-monopoly regulation 0.30   
 
 
There was some variation around this average score (0.3) according to surveyed 
firms’ size, stage of chain, commodity sector, and vertical integration status (results 
not shown here). A somewhat counter-intuitive result is that larger firms view stricter 
anti-monopoly regulation as more of an opportunity (an average score of 0.5) than did 
smaller firms (0.27).  
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6. Contracts 
6.1. Use of contracts 
Some 78% of surveyed firms claimed to use written contracts in 2005, but the cover-
age of transactions by contracts differed by transaction type, and the distribution dif-
fered somewhat between 2000 and 2005. Surveyed firms reported that a considerably 
higher proportion of transactions for “food and farm-based purchases” employed con-
tracts than did other input purchases. 
 
Table 22’s results are subdivided into (i) all surveyed firms and (ii) firms using con-
tracts. Part (ii)’s results show that the average proportion of transactions using con-
tracts was higher for farm and food-based purchases than for the other transactions 
listed. Moreover, across all categories of transaction listed, the proportion employing 
contracts increased significantly. The increase in the farm/food-based purchases was 
the largest of all.  
 
Table 22. Transactions covered by written contracts, all firms 
    
 2000 2005  
    
 
(i
 
) Average % of transactions by all firms 
% of transactions covered by 
written contract  s
   
farm/food-based purchases 46% 51%  
other input purchases 25% 26%  
sales to retailers 28% 31%  
s
 
ales to wholesalers/distributors 28% 
 
32%  
  
% of all firms using contracts in 2005 78%   
    
(ii) Average % of transactions by firms using contracts 2000 2005 t-test 
    
farm/food-based purchases 58% 64% *** 
other input purchases 31% 33% *** 
sales to retailers 35% 40% *** 
sales to wholesalers/distributors 36% 41% **   
non-responses included in “not using contracts”. 
Key: ns not significant; * 10% level of test; ** 5% level of test; *** 1% level of test. 
 
 
 
Amongst surveyed firms using contracts, the bias toward written contracts for food 
and farm-based inputs is most extreme for smaller size classes of surveyed firms (see 
table 23). Conversely, amongst larger firms the majority of transactions within the 
food chain (e.g. sales to retailers) are covered by written contracts, while this is not 
the case for smaller firms. 
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Table 23. Transactions covered by contracts by sales 
       
 Size group (million DKK sales) 
       
 
 
 <10  10-50  50-
 
250 250-500  500-1000   >1000  
     
Transaction type % of transactions covered by written contracts 
       
farm/food-based purchases 90% 61% 65% 62% 44% 64% 
other input purchases 14% 15% 31% 68% 42% 71% 
sales to retailers 40% 14% 44% 23% 54% 78% 
sales to wholesalers/distributors 38% 24% 37% 71% 51% 59%   
N
 
ote: Only firms using contracts. 
 
 
There are few apparent differences between processing, wholesale and retail firms in 
their use of contracts (table 24). Across these three stages, contracts are more com-
monly used for transactions for food and farm-based products than for other inputs, 
and a minority of sales to retailers, and wholesalers and distributors, are covered by 
written contracts.  
 
Table 24. Transactions covered by contracts by stage 
    
 
 
S
 
tage of chain 
  
 Processing Wholesale Retail 
    
T
 
ransaction type % of transactions covered by written contracts 
   
farm/food-based purchases 62% 52% 76% 
other input purchases 32% 30% 34% 
sales to retailers 46% 43%  
sales to wholesalers/distributors 45% 33%    
Note: Only firms using contracts. 
 
 
 
Firms in the dairy, poultry and fruits and vegetables sectors report using written con-
tracts for purchases of food and farm-based inputs to a far greater extent than do firms 
in other sectors (table 25). Across most sectors, a minority of other transactions use 
written contracts. 
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Table 25. Transactions covered by contracts by sector 
        
 Sector 
        
 
Fruit and vege-
tables 
D
airy 
Beef 
Pork  
Poultry  
U
nspecialised 
m
eat 
U
nspecialised  
        
Transaction type % of transactions covered by written contracts 
        
farm/food-based purchases 74% 85% 0% 73% 82% 45% 63% 
other input purchases 36% 49% 8% 30% 13% 20% 36% 
sales to retailers 32% 40% 36% 38% 35% 31% 47% 
sales to wholesalers/distributors 46% 56% 0% 38% 33% 27% 46%   
N
 
ote: Only firms using contracts. 
 
 
Vertically-integrated firms report using written contracts to a greater extent than do 
non-vertically-integrated firms (table 26). For all transactions involving input pur-
chases (food and farm-based and others) inward- and outward-integrated firms report 
greater use of contracts than the other categories of firm. Firms vertically integrated 
“inwards” report relatively few transactions with retailers and wholesalers being cov-
ered by contracts, but at similar levels to non-vertically-integrated firms. 
 
Table 26. Transactions covered by contracts by vertical integration 
     
 
 
Vertical integration tatus s
    
 
Vertical integrati-
on  inwards 
Vertical inte-
gration out-
wards 
Vertical 
integration   
inwards and 
outwards 
No vertical 
integration 
     
Transaction type % of transactions covered by written contracts 
     
farm/food-based purchases 68% 67% 88% 63% 
other input purchases 49% 44% 55% 24% 
sales to retailers 37% 64% 54% 35% 
sales to wholesalers/distributors 33% 66% 51% 38%   
Note: Only firms using contracts. 
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6.2. Length of contracts 
Firms were asked about changes in the length of their contracts, but few (18% of the 
sample) responded to this question. All responding firms reported that contracts had 
become “longer” in the period 2000-2005. 
6.3. Content of contracts 
Firms using written contracts report some substantial changes in the content of con-
tracts between 2000 and 2005 (table 27). There was an increase in incidence of almost 
all contract items proposed in the questionnaire. The largest changes include food 
safety (up from 49 to 67% of firms specifying this item in their contracts between 
2000 and 2005 respectively) and the provision of information enabling traceability 
and quality assessment.  
 
There is some evidence of transfer of physical and logistic tasks and responsibilities 
between chain stages. 12% of firms report that in 2005 contracts included stocking of 
shelves, up from just 7% in 2000, and for delivery to the buyer the increase has been 
from 48 to 62% of firms. Responsibility for packaging has apparently also become 
more common in contracts. There has been a small increase in the extent to which ad-
vertising and promotion responsibilities have been included in written contracts used 
by surveyed firms, but contracts’ treatment of failed and unsold products seems to 
have changed little. A further noteworthy result is the increase in appearance of public 
liability items in written contracts. 
 
Table 27. Content of contracts for all firms using contracts 
    
Contract item for which responsibility is assumed 2000 2005  
    
% of firms reporting  
this item  in contracts χ2-test 
    
Food safety 49% 67% *** 
Information enabling product traceability  42% 63% *** 
Selecting the standard to be used in the quality specification 30% 42% *** 
Accuracy of quality information 46% 57% *** 
Packaging 41% 54% *** 
Delivery to buyer 48% 62% *** 
Stocking of shelves 7% 12% ** 
Refunds to the buyer for unsold products 12% 12% ns 
Compensating the buyer for failed new products 9% 12% * 
Advertising of new products 35% 35% ns 
Advertising of non-new products 27% 35% *** 
The costs of promotions and promotional price reductions 25% 34% *** 
Insurance during transport and warehousing 44% 55% *** 
Public liability insurance 46% 60% ***   
K
 
ey: ns not significant; * 10% level of test; ** 5% level of test; *** 1% level of test. 
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Table 28 presents information about the allocation of responsibility for selected con-
tract items across stages of the chain in 2005. A large majority of processing and 
wholesale firms report assuming responsibility for food safety, information regarding 
traceability and quality, transport and delivery, and public liability; and these results 
differ sharply from those reported by retailers.  
 
Table 28. Contents of contracts, by stage of chain 
    
 Stage of chain 
    
 
 
Processing 
 
Wholesale 
 
Retail* 
 
Contract item for which responsibility is assumed in 2005 
% of firms that in the sales* contracts as-
sume responsibility for: 
    
Food safety 71% 69% 47% 
Information enabling product traceability  60% 72% 47% 
Selecting the standard to be used in the quality specifica-
tion 43% 44% 32% 
Accuracy of quality information 62% 59% 37% 
Packaging 62% 59% 21% 
Delivery to buyer 64% 72% 32% 
Stocking of shelves 12% 13% 16% 
Refunds to the buyer for unsold products 10% 16% 11% 
Compensating the buyer for failed new products 14% 16% 5% 
Advertising of new products 33% 31% 53% 
Advertising of non-new products 31% 38% 47% 
The costs of promotions and promotional price reductions 38% 28% 42% 
Insurance during transport and warehousing 60% 75% 5% 
Public liability insurance 62% 69% 37%   
*
 
 For retail firms the contracts are purchase contracts. 
 
 
When the same survey information is disaggregated by commodity sector (table 29), a 
number of differences appear. Fruits and vegetables and pork industry firms over-
whelmingly claim not to assume responsibility for food safety in their sales contracts, 
whereas the opposite is true for all other sectors. Substantial variation amongst sectors 
exists for contract items such as information provision, promotion of new products 
and public liability. 
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Table 29. Contents of contracts, by sector  
        
 Sector 
        
 
Fruit and vege-
tables 
D
airy 
Beef 
Pork  
Poultry  
U
nspecialised 
m
eat 
U
nspecialised  
        
Content of contracts 2005 % of firms that in the sales contracts assume responsibility for: 
        
Food safety 50% 67% 75% 50% 83% 69% 67% 
Information enabling product tracea-
bility  50% 67% 75% 0% 67% 69% 63% 
Selecting the standard to be used in 
the quality specification 42% 33% 50% 50% 33% 38% 46% 
Accuracy of quality information 58% 40% 75% 50% 83% 63% 54% 
Packaging 58% 60% 50% 50% 17% 50% 57% 
Delivery to buyer 58% 53% 50% 50% 83% 56% 65% 
Stocking of shelves 8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 25% 15% 
Refunds to the buyer for unsold 
products 8% 13% 25% 0% 0% 0% 17% 
Compensating the buyer for failed 
new products 8% 27% 25% 0% 0% 6% 11% 
Advertising of new products 33% 13% 25% 50% 17% 44% 41% 
Advertising of non-new products 33% 7% 25% 50% 17% 50% 41% 
The costs of promotions and promo-
tional price reductions 17% 33% 25% 50% 33% 38% 37% 
Insurance during transport and ware-
housing 42% 53% 75% 50% 67% 63% 52% 
Public liability insurance 42% 47% 75% 50% 67% 69% 63%   
N
 
ote: For retail firms the contracts are purchase contracts. 
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7. Retailers’ own-label brands 
7.1. Use of retailers’ own-label brands 
Some 42% of surveyed firms sold retailers’ own-label brands in 2005 (see table 30), 
which is a statistically-significant increase on 2000’s figure (33%). Across all firms, 
just 7-8% of revenues were derived from such sales, but amongst the firms selling re-
tailers’ own-label brands the share of sales was about 20% and unchanged between 
2000 and 2005. 
 
Table 30. Use of retailers’ own-label brands 
    
All firms  
2000 2005 χ2-test 
    
% of firms that sell retailers own label brands 33% 42% ** 
    
Average % of sales from retailers' own-label brands   t-test 
    
Sellers of retailers' own-label brands 21% 20% ns 
All firms 7% 8%    
K
 
ey: ns not significant; * 10% level of test; ** 5% level of test; *** 1% level of test. 
7.2. Impressions of retailers’ own-label brands 
Over 60% of surveyed firms claimed not to know the impacts of retailers’ own-label 
brands (see table 31) on their own operations. Amongst firms providing an opinion, a 
strong majority (33% compared to 5%) claimed that they are less profitable than the 
firms’ brands. Qualified majorities also claimed that retailers’ own-label brands 
helped utilise spare capacity and were complementary to (rather than competing with) 
the firms’ brands. Qualified majorities rejected the idea that commercial information 
was exchanged. “Overall”, 31% of surveyed firms reported retailers’ own-label 
brands to be “a positive thing for the firm”, against just 7% claiming the opposite. 
 
Table 31. All firms’ impressions of the impacts of r.o.l.b. 
    
 Yes No Don't know 
    
A
 
re retailers' own label brands and accompanying contracts… % of firms  
   
 competing with the firm's brands?  22% 18% 60% 
 complementary to the firm's brands?  24% 15% 61% 
 a good way of utilising spare production capacity?  25% 13% 62% 
 a good way of receiving information from retailers?  15% 22% 63% 
 a good way of giving commercial information to retailers?  14% 21% 65% 
 more profitable than the firm's brands?  5% 33% 63% 
 overall, a positive thing for the firm?  31% 7% 63%   
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Small firms answered “don’t know” to all questions about the impacts of retailers’ 
own-label brands (table 32), whereas for the largest firms one third to one half of 
firms answered this way. Amongst the larger firms there is reasonable consistency in 
assessment. By similar margins, firms in all size classes agree that retailers’ own-label 
brands are a positive thing overall, but differ somewhat in the assessment of their 
profitability relative to firms’ brands. Notably, majorities of the largest firms claim 
that retailers’ own-label brands are both competitive with, and complementary to, the 
firms’ brands: this result is probably due to these largest firms’ involvement with 
multiple brands of both types. In the 500-1000 million DKK sales category, 43% of 
firms report that retailers’ own-label brands are competing with their brands and just 
29% claimed that they are complementary. 
 
Table 32. Impressions of the impacts of r.o.l.b., by size 
       
 Size group (million DKK sales) 
       
 <10 50-250 
       
 Yes No Don't know Yes No 
Don't 
know 
       
Are retailers' own label brands and accompanying con-
tracts… % of firms 
       
 competing with the firm's brands?  0% 0% 100% 18% 35% 48% 
 complementary to the firm's brands?  0% 0% 100% 35% 18% 48% 
 a good way of utilising spare production capacity?  0% 0% 100% 38% 15% 48% 
 a good way of receiving information from retailers?  0% 0% 100% 18% 35% 48% 
 a good way of giving commercial information to retail-
ers?  0% 0% 100% 20% 30% 50% 
 more profitable than the firm's brands?  0% 0% 100% 5% 48% 48% 
 overall, a positive thing for the firm?  0% 0% 100% 43% 8% 50% 
       
 500-1000 >1000 
       
 Yes No Don't  know Yes No 
Don't 
now k
       
Are retailers' own label brands and accompanying con-
racts… t
 
% of firms 
      
 competing with the firm's brands?  43% 14% 43% 67% 0% 33% 
 complementary to the firm's brands?  29% 14% 57% 58% 8% 33% 
 a good way of utilising spare production capacity?  29% 14% 57% 50% 8% 42% 
 a good way of receiving information from retailers?  14% 29% 57% 17% 42% 42% 
 a good way of giving commercial information to retail-
ers?  29% 14% 57% 25% 33% 42% 
 more profitable than the firm's brands?  0% 43% 57% 17% 33% 50% 
 overall, a positive thing for the firm?  43% 14% 43% 50% 8% 42%   
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Amongst stages of the chain, about one third of processors answered “don’t know”, 
compared to two thirds of wholesalers (table 33). There is substantial agreement be-
tween firms in the two stages presented here on the impacts of retailers’ own-label 
brands, with the exception of the utilisation of capacity and the exchange of informa-
tion with retailers: a substantial share of processing firms acknowledged the informa-
tion exchange role of retailers’ own-label brands. 
 
Table 33. Impressions of the impacts of r.o.l.b., by stage 
       
 Stage of chain 
       
 Processing Wholesale/ distribution 
       
 % of firms 
       
Are retailers' own label brands and accompanying con-
tracts… Yes No 
Don't 
know Yes No 
Don't 
know 
       
 competing with the firm's brands?  33% 30% 37% 23% 15% 62% 
 complementary to the firm's brands?  35% 26% 39% 28% 10% 62% 
 a good way of utilising spare production capacity?  48% 13% 39% 13% 23% 64% 
 a good way of receiving information from retailers?  30% 28% 43% 10% 28% 62% 
 a good way of giving commercial information to retail-
ers?  24% 31% 44% 10% 23% 67% 
 more profitable than the firm's brands?  6% 54% 41% 8% 28% 64% 
 overall, a positive thing for the firm?  48% 11% 41% 33% 5% 62%   
 
Figure 11 presents firms’ responses by commodity sector (for presentational clarity, 
just the “yes” responses). In general, dairy firms are more positive about retailers’ 
own-label brands than those in other sectors. Few firms from any sector report that 
retailers’ own-label brands are more profitable than the firms’ brands, but 20-40% of 
firms in all sectors agree that there is a benefit from improved capacity utilisation. 
Firms in poultry and unspecialised sectors appear less concerned about competing 
brands than those in other sectors, while there is a range of reported impacts on in-
formation sharing. Firms in fruits and vegetables and dairy sectors are more inclined 
than those in other sectors to report that retailers’ own-label brands are a positive 
thing “overall”. 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 11. Firms' impressions of retailers’ own-label brands, by sector of responding firm 
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 Firms vertically integrated both inwards and outwards are, proportionately, far more 
supportive of retailers’ own-label brands than are other firms.  
 
Table 34. Impressions of the impacts of r.o.l.b., by vertical integration 
       
 Vertical integration status 
       
 Vertical integration 
 inwards 
Vertical integration 
outwards 
       
 % of firms 
       
Are retailers' own label brands and accompanying 
contracts… Yes No 
Don't 
know Yes No 
Don't 
know 
       
 competing with the firm's brands?  32% 29% 39% 32% 20% 48% 
 complementary to the firm's brands?  39% 21% 39% 36% 12% 52% 
 a good way of utilising spare production capacity?  39% 21% 39% 28% 16% 56% 
 a good way of receiving information from retailers?  25% 36% 39% 20% 28% 52% 
 a good way of giving commercial information to re-
tailers?  25% 29% 46% 24% 16% 60% 
 more profitable than the firm's brands?  0% 61% 39% 4% 40% 56% 
 
 
overall, a positive thing for the firm?  46% 11% 43% 44% 4% 52% 
      
 Vertical integration 
inwards  
and outwards 
No vertical integration 
   
 % of firms 
       
Are retailers' own label brands and accompanying 
contracts… Yes No 
Don't 
know Yes No 
Don't 
know 
       
 competing with the firm's brands?  80% 20% 0% 19% 13% 67% 
 complementary to the firm's brands?  80% 20% 0% 19% 13% 67% 
 a good way of utilising spare production capacity?  80% 20% 0% 23% 10% 67% 
 a good way of receiving information from retailers?  80% 20% 0% 14% 16% 70% 
 a good way of giving commercial information to re-
tailers?  60% 20% 20% 10% 20% 70% 
 more profitable than the firm's brands?  0% 100% 0% 6% 25% 69% 
 overall, a positive thing for the firm?  80% 0% 20% 24% 6% 70%   
 
 
Finally, table 35 presents firms’ views on the impact of retailers’ own-label brands, 
disaggregated by whether or not firms actually use retailers’ own-label brands. The 
great majority of firms not using retailers’ own-label brands respond “don’t know” to 
most questions. Amongst firms that do use retailers’ own-label brands, there is an 
overall positive evaluation of retailers’ own-label brands but an emphatic statement 
(62% answering “no”) that firms are less profitable than firms’ brands.  
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Table 35. Impressions of the impacts of r.o.l.b., by use of r.o.l.b. 
       
 Use of r.o.l.b. status 
       
 
 
User  of r.o.l . s
 
.b
 
Non-us rs of r.o.l.b. e
    
 % of firms 
       
Are retailers' own label brands and accompanying con-
tracts… Yes No 
Don't 
know Yes No 
Don't 
know 
       
 competing with the firm's brands?  40% 35% 25% 4% 4% 91% 
 complementary to the firm's brands?  49% 25% 25% 3% 6% 91% 
 a good way of utilising spare production capacity?  53% 25% 27% 4% 6% 91% 
 a good way of receiving information from retailers?  27% 20% 29% 3% 4% 91% 
 a good way of giving commercial information to retail-
ers?  27% 40% 33% 1% 7% 91% 
 more profitable than the firm's brands?  9% 62% 29% 1% 7% 91% 
 overall, a positive thing for the firm?  62% 9% 29% 3% 4% 93%   
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 8. Discussion and Conclusions 
8.1. Overview 
This study employs a recent survey of firms’ views to examine trends in competitive 
structures and practices in the Danish food industry. Based on prevailing theory and 
known recent trends in aggregate data, hypotheses were formed and tested (see table 
36). Overall, there is weak evidence of firms’ having experienced narrowing food 
marketing chains and increasingly concentrated sales and purchasing channels in the 
period 2000-2005. However, firms’ views and claimed actions on transactions and 
competition have changed substantially in this period. This is particularly pronounced 
in use and content of contracts, views on market power, attitudes to retailers’ own-
label and adopted practices such as vertical integration. This paper provides some evi-
dence to suggest that sector-, commodity- and size-specific concerns exist for firms 
regarding competition and transactions in the Danish food marketing chain. 
 
Amongst surveyed firms, the average reported number of suppliers fell by 23% be-
tween 2000 and 2005 while the average number of buyers18 fell about 10%. Falls in 
the numbers of suppliers were greatest for the very smallest and very largest firms, 
while medium-sized to large firms (500-1000 million DKK in sales) reported an in-
crease of 23% in the number of buyers. The smallest firms also reported the largest 
fall in the number of buyers, although results were mixed amongst size classes. Proc-
essors, and firms in most specialised commodity sectors, reported the greatest de-
clines in number of suppliers. Owing to large sample variances, few statistically-
significant results emerge.  
 
Most (non-retail) stages of the food marketing chain reported a 5-10% decline in 
number of buyers between 2000 and 2005. These changes were pronounced  amongst 
unspecialised firms: commodity-specialised firms generally reported an increase in 
the number of buyers. Firms with no vertical integration report a slight reduction in 
both suppliers and buyers. The relationship between vertical integration and buyers 
and sellers offers little insight: all vertically integrated firms report a reduction in 
numbers of suppliers but only those vertically-integrated “outwards” (owning shares 
in firms at different points in the chain) report declines in the number of buyers. 
                                                 
18 Measures of the number of buyers exclude retail firms, for whom buyers are retail customers.  
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Table 36. Overview of hypotheses tested 
    
 T
 
opic H
 
ypotheses R
 
esult 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
Numbers of sellers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Numbers of buyers 
 
 
 
• Decline 2000-2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Decline 2000-2005 
• Average numbers of suppliers and buyers 
have declined, but results are, for the most 
part, statistically insignificant. 
• Processing firms, dairy and fruit & veg. 
sector firms, and vertically-integrated (out-
wards) firms reported declines in seller 
numbers that were statistically significant. 
• Large firms, wholesalers and unspecial-
ised meat sector firms report increases in 
numbers of sellers that are statistically sig-
nificant. 
• No dis-aggregation of firms revealed a pat-
tern of statistically-significant decline in 
numbers of buyers between 2000 and 
2005. Dairy and unspecialised meat sector 
firms reported large increases that were 
statistically significant. 
    
3 Concentration in trading 
partners 
• Currently high 
• More intense 2000-
2005 
• Concentration amongst suppliers is higher 
in 2005 than is concentration amongst 
buyers. 
• Concentration amongst both suppliers and 
buyers has become less intense between 
2000 and 2005, although the result varies 
across types of firm. 
    
4 Firms’ views on location of 
market power 
• Most firms identify re-
tailers 
• 73% of firms identified retailers as holding 
the most market power; 16%  identified 
processors. Views largely unchanged be-
tween 2000 and 2005. 
    
5 Form of market power 
exercised 
• Changes in form 2000-
2005 
• Differ depending on 
location of the  market 
power 
• Differ depending on 
the type of firm making 
the claim 
• Many firms will claim to 
experience within-
chain instruments (e.g. 
slotting fees, shifts of 
risk), rather than con-
ventional monopoly-
monopsony action  
• Firms’ views indicate only slight changes in 
form between 2000 and 2005. 
• Firms identifying retailers as holding the 
market power claim that market power 
takes the form of buyer-side (monopsony) 
pressure and within-chain activities includ-
ing use of retailers’ own-label. 
• Firms identifying processors as holding the 
market power claim that exclusive dealing 
and manipulation of the policy process are 
the main forms of market power used, 
along with monopsony action. 
• Firms’ views differ according to size, stage 
of chain, sector and vertical integration 
practice.    
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Table 36. (Continued) Overview of hypotheses tested 
    
 
 
T
 
opic H
 
ypotheses Resul
 
t 
6 Contracts • Food treated differently to other 
purchases 
• More widely used 2000-2005 
• Longer 2000-2005 
• Contracts changed in content 
2000-2005 
• Usage differs amongst types of 
firm 
• Content differs amongst types of 
firm 
• Transactions for farm/food based pur-
chases more frequently (64% of transac-
tions) than do transactions for other pur-
poses (30-40%). 
• All transactions were more likely to use 
written contracts in 2005 than in 2000. The 
rate of increase was highest for farm/food 
based transactions. 
• No conclusion drawn on length of con-
tracts. 
• Content of contracts has changed mark-
edly between 2000 and 2005. Food safety 
as a contract item is reported by 67% of 
firms in 2005, c.f. just 49% in 2000. Infor-
mation provision, quality assurance and 
public liability all showed large increases in 
incidence in contracts. Within-chain ac-
tions (slotting fees, promotions costs) are 
not widely reported and generally have not 
grown in incidence between 2000 and 
2005. 
• Content of contracts differs very widely 
amongst types of firm. 
    
7 New product 
development 
• Firms will claim that market 
power is a significant constraint 
• Few firms view market power as a con-
straint. 
• The number of firms with this view in-
creased slightly (but statistically signifi-
cantly) between 2000 and 2005. 
    
8 “Stricter anti- 
Monopoly 
policy” 
• Large firms view this as a threat, 
smaller firms as an opportunity 
• 67% of firms view “stricter anti-monopoly 
policy” as neither an opportunity nor a 
threat 
• No conclusions about patterns amongst 
types of firm. 
    
9 Retailers’ own- 
label brands 
• Not favoured by firms 
• Seen as less profitable than 
manufacturers’ brands 
• Overall, seen as a negative thing 
• 60% of surveyed firms gave no view about 
retailers’ own-label brands. The majority of 
these firms did not use retailers’ own-label 
brands. 
• Retailers’ own-label brands appear to be 
popular amongst remaining surveyed firms 
because of their utilisation of spare capac-
ity and apparent complementarity with 
firms’ marketing actions. The reasoning 
seems to vary amongst firm types. 
• Surveyed firms overwhelmingly claim that 
retailers’ own-label brands are less profit-
able than are private brands. 
• A qualified majority of firms (31%, c.f. 7% 
disagreeing and 63% caliming “don’t 
know”) claim that retailers’ own-label 
brands are a “positive thing for the firm, 
overall”.   
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 The surveyed firms appear to face rather concentrated markets. In 2005, the average 
figure was that just 9% of firms’ suppliers supplied 75% of agriculturally-related in-
puts. On the selling side the figure was 39%. In both cases the average was little 
changed between 2000 and 2005, although concentration in the number of buyers 
may have eased somewhat in this period. However, the smallest firms clearly faced 
increased concentration, and only amongst medium-large firms (500-1000 million 
DKK in sales) and wholesalers, did concentration ease on both buying and selling 
sides. Processors reported a large increase in concentration amongst suppliers, but a 
moderate one amongst buyers. Retailers reported increasing concentration amongst 
suppliers. Examination of the co-occurrence between concentration in firms’ buying 
and selling sides yielded a statistically-insignificant correlation co-efficient of around 
7%. This indicates few firm-specific determinants of concentration amongst trading 
partners. 
 
Surveyed firms’ views are that the location of market power within the food market-
ing chain has changed little between 2000 and 2005. Around 70% of firms claimed 
that retailers “held the most market power”, and about 15% claimed it was processors. 
About 10% did not know. Similarly, firms reported little change in the forms of exer-
cise of market power in the food marketing chain: with claims of monopsony action 
far outweighing those of monopoly, and within-chain actions by retailers dominating 
the responses. When responses were disaggregated by choice of location of market 
power, the claimed instruments were quite different, with powerful processors being 
accused of exclusive trading and influencing the policy environment, and retailers’ 
use of within-chain bargaining power and own-label brands being widely identified. 
 
Some 78% of firms claimed to use written contracts in 2005. For those firms that use 
them, on average 64% of agriculturally-based transactions use contracts, which is far 
higher than for other input purchases. This difference was much more pronounced for 
small firms, and varied substantially amongst commodity sectors. Firms that were not 
vertically integrated showed no different preference for written contracts than did 
firms vertically integrated in some way.  
 
Surveyed firms report that the content of contracts has changed substantially between 
2000 and 2005. Contract items becoming more common include food safety, informa-
tion regarding traceability and quality, responsibility for transport and delivery, and 
public liability. Firms at different stages of the chain report markedly different con-
tract contents. Just 13-20% of firms claim that market conditions associated with 
competition and market power are “major barriers to new product development and 
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 introduction”, and the prevalence of introduction-related items (e.g. advertising and 
promotion of new products, and compensation for failed products) in contracts re-
mains at about the same levels for 2000 and 2005. 
 
Almost half the surveyed firms sold retailers’ own-label brands in 2005, whereas just 
a third did so in 2000. For those firms, the share in sales of such brands is unchanged 
at about 20%. A substantial majority of firms (about 60% of those surveyed) claimed 
to know little about the impact of retailers’ own-label brands, although large firms 
were more forthcoming with opinions. Notably, firms not using these brands gener-
ally did not venture an opinion, so that results presented represent informed views. A 
majority of responding firms stated that retailers’ own-label brands are less profitable 
that the firms’ own brands, and a majority also stated that retailers’ own-label brands 
are “overall, a positive thing for the firm”. Amongst commodity sectors, firms dealing 
with fruits and vegetables, pork, poultry and dairy products were the most enthusiastic 
about retailers’ own-label. Perceived benefits included the utilisation of production 
capacity, there was mixed support for the idea that they compete with the firms’ 
brands. Survey results revealed that few firms claimed that market power was a con-
straint on new products’ development and introduction. However, there was a statisti-
cally-significant increase in the proportion of firms making such claims between 2000 
and 2005. 
 
Surveyed firms were generally indifferent to the prospect of change in antimonopoly 
regulation: specifically to a hypothetical change to make it “stricter”. In aggregate, 
firms rated such a change as “neither an opportunity nor a threat”. When disaggre-
gated by size, stage and commodity sector, little pattern emerged although service 
providers and ingredients suppliers rated this a substantial opportunity. 
8.2. Conclusions for commercial firms 
Amongst surveyed firms, processors and small firms have seen the biggest declines in 
numbers of buyers and sellers, and the greatest increase in buyer and seller concentra-
tion. Retailers have seen numbers of suppliers fall, indicating consolidation amongst 
processors. These results reflect the falling numbers of farmers and firms in the Dan-
ish food marketing chain, and concentration amongst those that remain. The results 
indicate structural change in favour of large firms and toward a narrower food mar-
keting chain. 
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 As a response to the reduction in numbers of buyers and sellers, vertical integration 
has been a popular choice by firms. Use of contracts for transactions of farm and food 
products has also increased during the period surveyed, and this has been most pro-
nounced amongst small firms and commodity-specialised firms. The use, and form, of 
vertical integration appears to be related to firms’ experience of concentration 
amongst buyers and sellers, and it influences firms’ claims about the location and ex-
ercise of market power, and the use of contracts in transactions. 
 
Small firms studied here tend to view anti-competitive behaviour in the food market-
ing system rather differently than do larger firms. A fifth of them claim not to know 
how market power is exercised, which is a higher proportion than for most size 
classes. About half of small firms surveyed express the view that the exercise of mar-
ket power is mostly activated on the buying (as opposed to selling) side, and involves 
networking and the manipulation of the policy process. Small firms emphasise within-
chain actions by powerful firms, such as the threat of non-purchase (“de-listing”) and 
shifting of risks within the chain. Small firms are not necessarily oriented against re-
tailers, however, as they claim the same incidence of use of retailers’ own-label as an 
instrument of market power, and enthusiasm for their use, as do other firms. 
 
Commodity-specialised firms have seen rather greater concentration amongst suppli-
ers than amongst buyers. This is not consistent with their identifying within-chain ac-
tions and exclusivity in purchasing (but not selling) arrangements as instruments of 
market power within the food marketing chain. Most specialised firms identify the 
use of retailers’ own-label brands as an instrument of market power, apparently by 
way of their competing with the firms’ own brands. However, specialised firms are 
positive, overall, about such brands. 
 
Use of written contracts appears to be somewhat more popular amongst commodity-
specialised firms than other firms. With respect to the responsibilities assumed in con-
tracts, however, the content of contracts varies a great deal amongst specialised firms 
according to their commodity sector. The content of contracts used by firms special-
ised in fruits and vegetables have much in common with that applied by the poultry 
industry, and have little in common with that in the dairy industry. It appears that if 
there are anti-competitive pressures exerted by buyers through the contracting mecha-
nism, then they impact the different commodity sectors quite differently. 
 
Surveyed firms’ attitudes to retailers’ own-label brands indicate that they serve a use-
ful marketing purpose, and although they are less profitable than firms’ own brands, 
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 are still viewed as a positive thing overall. The nature of the “marketing purpose” re-
mains unclear, as firms do not overwhelmingly report benefits such as information 
exchange, although improved capacity utilisation is a popular response. 
 
According to firms that claim that processors hold the most market power, processors 
exercise influence on the policy process. Rather fewer firms that identify retailers as 
holding the most market power claim that retailers do the same thing. Moreover, few 
firms claim that such actions as collusive “networking” and policy-related contacts 
with “organisations” and “politicians” are common, regardless of the claimed location 
of market power. 
8.3. Conclusions for policy makers 
Firms’ claimed impacts of market power differ according to whether processors or 
retailers are the perceived holders and exercisers of market power. This result calls for 
food industry policy that addresses stages of the food marketing chain in specific 
ways, rather than as a “bloc” of undifferentiated organisations between farm and con-
sumer. 
 
In the view of surveyed firms, conventional impacts of market power (monopoly ef-
fects) appear to be attributed to powerful processors, as opposed to monopsony and 
within-chain actions, which are attributed to powerful retailers. Policies designed to 
combat the exercise of market power must therefore have differing problem diagnos-
tics, targets and palliative instruments, according to the suspected origins of the mar-
ket power. Surveyed firms appear to be uninspired by the consequences of stricter an-
timonopoly regulation, but quite clear in their concerns about slotting fees, de-listing 
threats and other within-chain actions by buyers. 
 
It is a notable result that although firms identify consolidation and concentration 
much more strongly on the “supplier side” than amongst buyers of their products, 
they identify problems associated with market power on the buying side rather than 
the supplier side. This result is generally maintained despite the differences according 
to firms’ views on the location of market power within the food marketing chain. The 
conclusion drawn is that the exercise of market power has less to do with market con-
centration than with narrowing of channels as described in the literature as “food con-
vergence”. This has been associated with the presence of one dominant (“focal”) firm 
that may dictate conduct throughout the chain or network while not engaging in the 
behaviour itself.  
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 In the competitive environment sketched by these survey results, small firms and 
processing firms are clearly facing greater challenges than other firms in terms of 
consolidation and concentration. However, their actions taken in terms of transactions 
(contracting and vertical integration) appear to be loosely linked to their perceptions 
of anti-competitive behaviour in the food marketing chain. 
 
An unsurprising result of the survey is that firms specialised by commodity sector dif-
fer in their definition of competitive problems, and in the nature of their transactions. 
The striking differences in the content of contracts, for example, reflect not only lo-
gistic and physical differences amongst commodity sectors, but also the different in-
cidence that industry-wide policies have. As an example, policies toward food safety 
and traceability are conceptually neutral across commodity sectors, but responsibility 
for them is being assigned quite differently amongst commodity sectors.  
 
Few firms surveyed interpret the developments identified in this survey as an im-
pediment to innovation, and there is comparatively little evidence of restrictions of 
firms’ access to markets. This conclusion indicates that policies designed to encour-
age innovation might be developed and implemented independent of competitive con-
duct in markets.  
8.4. Recommended future research 
This survey addresses food industry firms across a spectrum of commodity sector, 
size and stage of chain. It uses a small sample and its degree of representation of the 
view of all food industry firms may be questioned. A first recommendation for further 
research is greater access to firms on a narrower range of questions directly associated 
with policies or commercial strategies that may assist firms in dealing with the mod-
ern competitive and transaction environment. 
 
Price series have played a key role in industrial economics analysis in the past, but 
studies of vertical agro-industrial arrangements (as in this survey) usually do not ac-
cess price data. An increasingly pressing research need is the development of conven-
ient and meaningful indicators of competitiveness and within-chain equity that are not 
reliant on prices. The current study presents tables of results as an indication of firms’ 
views on specific questions related to these topics, and represents a first step in identi-
fying new sets of indicators.  
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 Beyond the data and its analysis, a further research need is the exposure of firms to 
genuine policy scenarios. The current study deals with firms’ problem definitions and 
their responses to them. Although this provides a unique data set of firms’ views on 
such problems, it lacks strong policy advocacy because firms have not been presented 
with options for policy change. Such an exchange of information would necessarily 
involve firms directly with agencies of government.  
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